Crisis management is exercised at the highest level by Ministers, either individually or in committee.  Crises may be handled by the Overseas Policy and Defence Committee (OPDC) of the Cabinet, or by a special Cabinet committee set up to coordinate the work of all the Government departments involved.  The Permanent Under-Secretary (PUS) is the government’s senior adviser on defence policy and expenditure, but CDS is the ultimate source of military advice to Ministers.  Chief of the Naval Staff (CNS), Chief of the General Staff (CGS) and Chief of the Air Staff (CAS) (collectively known as the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)), as the professional heads of their Services, offer expert advice to Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) on the employment of their forces and the strategic direction of operations, usually in the forum of the Chiefs of Staff Committee.

Below the Chiefs of Staff Committee, there is a Defence Crisis Management Organisation (DCMO) that prepares advice for the Chiefs of Staff, the PUS, and Ministers.  It is made up of elements of the Central Staffs in the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ), working in close partnership, together with Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS).

The Ministry of Defence (MOD) is the focal point for advice, liaison and military direction to other Government departments, allies and international organisations.  In particular, during a crisis, the Central Staffs in the MOD bring together staff from different disciplines in Current Commitment Teams (CCTs) to tackle issues as they arise.  Under normal day-to-day conditions and for minor crises, staffs operate from their usual offices in the MOD Main Building, but in major crises they are likely to use the Defence Crisis Management Centre (DCMC).

The PJHQ contributes to the decision-making process at the strategic level by carrying out a military strategic estimate, the result of which will determine whether a Joint Task Force (JTF) needs to be set up to deal with a crisis and what forces may be required.  When directed by CDS, the PJHQ is responsible for the planning and execution of joint, potentially joint, combined and multinational operations led by the UK.  It is also responsible for exercising Operational Command (OPCOM) of UK forces assigned to combined and multinational operations led by others.  It is commanded by Chief of Joint Operations (CJO), who will normally be appointed as Joint Commander (Jt Comd) for operations assigned to the Head Quarters (HQ) (although, if circumstances warrant, any of the single-Service Commander-in-Chief (CINC)s may be appointed as Jt Comd, with CJO as Deputy Jt Comd).  In a crisis, the HQ forms multi-disciplinary Contingency Planning Teams (CPTs) and Operations Teams which, together with the CCTs in the MOD, play a full part in formulating advice to CDS, JCS, PUS and Ministers.  Close contact is maintained with the single-Service operational commands to ensure that single-Service advice is woven into coherent joint advice.

The HQ has no command responsibility for either North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) operations (in which command is exercised through NATO structures), or the following national operations:  

Nuclear operations,

Defence of the UK’s waters and airspace,

Military assistance to civil authorities (including operations in support of the civil power in Northern Ireland).

These particular national operations are either under immediate government control or can expect to come under immediate control and the PJHQ structure would only add an unnecessary layer of control.  They have also been the subject of significant investment in special facilities.

The DIS is responsible for providing strategic warning and current defence intelligence assessments and advice.  It provides military capability studies (including the capabilities of weapon systems) and continuous reporting on political and military developments world-wide which may influence national decision making and the strategic direction of operations.  The DIS is also the focal point for the coordination of the defence intelligence effort in support of operations, particularly in regard to collection, information requirements management and targeting support.  In addition, the PJHQ’s intelligence staffs monitors areas of emerging interest and maintains the Joint Operational Picture (JOP) of maritime, land and air activity within designated areas of operational responsibility or interest.  As an operational situation develops, the lead for certain intelligence responsibilities may be passed from the DIS to the PJHQ, reverting to DIS on completion of the operation.

The Jt Comd will usually delegate OPCON to a Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) in the theatre of operations, and assign him a Joint Operations Area (JOA), where he will be responsible for planning and conducting all operations.  On occasions, and when the scale of the operation demands, the JTFC will delegate Tactical Command (TACOM) of the environments of land, sea and air to Component Commanders (CCs) (i.e. Joint Forces Land Component Commander (JFLCC), Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC), and Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC)).  The CC concept is central to the joint C2 of British forces on operations, but the relationship and responsibilities of the Joint Force Component Commanders (JFCCs) to the JTFC will depend largely on the task and the personality of the JTFC.  The JTFC will allocate Area of Operations (AO) to each CC, the boundaries of which will be revised as the operation develops, but air power may be tasked across all AO boundaries.  CCs can be national, service or functional; therefore, depending upon the nature and scale of the operation, the JTFC may also nominate separate CCs to manage logistics, special forces and amphibious operations (i.e. Joint Force Logistics Component Commander (JFLogCC), Joint Forces Special Forces Component Commander (JFSFCC) and Joint Forces Amphibious Component Commander (JFAmphCC)).

The JTFC will prioritise theatre objectives and may employ combinations of forces and actions to achieve concentration in various dimensions to achieve the military objectives in the shortest possible time.  The setting of priorities by the JTFC will drive the phasing and focus of the component operations based on strategic, operational and tactical considerations.  The phasing of the theatre campaign provides an orderly schedule of military activities and will indicate step changes in priorities and intent that will determine the basic phasing of the component operations to achieve the desired coordination.  Geography, objectives, force composition or other constraints may dictate phasing.  Phases must always have clearly identifiable start and end points, but will often overlap to some extent.  In essence, the JTFC will shape and prepare his battlespace, attack the cohesion of his adversary, protect the cohesion of his own force, and exploit opportunities.

Mission Command  

British Forces apply the principle of mission command, in which commanders tell their subordinates what to achieve and why, rather than what to do and how.  At all levels, mission command is articulated through a statement of the commander’s guidance and intent, together with the articulation of his subordinates’ missions in the context of the overall plan.

The Jt Comd will issue a Mission Directive, expanding upon the military strategic direction given in CDS’s Directive, but it is the JTFC who will plan and fight the in-theatre campaign.  In particular, the JTFC will determine the campaign plan and related joint military operations, and set the operational objectives to be achieved at the tactical level by his subordinate CCs.  The JTFC will allocate resources, set priorities and direct events, integrating and sequencing the activities of the JTF as required.  Central to this process is the completion of a joint estimate which involves five key stages: mission analysis, evaluation of factors, consideration of possible Course of Action (COA), development of outline Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and the commander’s decision on the COA.

The terms supporting and supported commander are used to clarify potentially complex C2 arrangements that can result when one CC’s assets are controlled and tasked by another.  Support is the function performed by the forces of one or more components to assist the forces of another component.  The CC of the supported force will give details of the mission requirements to the supporting CC (or CCs).  The supporting CC will fulfil those requirements of the supported force that fall within the capability of the supporting forces.  The JTFC determines the supported and supporting relationship, but at different phases of an operation or campaign it is usual for one or another CC to be appointed the lead or supported commander, while the other CCs are required to support his operations.

All the CCs have a legitimate need to use the airspace within the Joint Operations Area (JOA), and the numbers of fixed and rotary wing aircraft, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), missiles, rockets and artillery wanting to use it are ever increasing.  There is a concomitant need to defend the airspace and deny its use to an opponent.  Moreover, civil and neutral flight operations may take place in the same area as military operations.  Consequently, Air Defence (AD) and Airborne Surveillance and Area Control (ASAC) of the JOA are both the responsibility of the JTFC, but authority for these functions will normally be vested in a CC.  Because of the integrated relationship between these activities and the execution of the joint air operation, the JFACC will normally be appointed as the Air Defence Commander (ADC) and the Airspace Control Authority (ACA).

For peacetime administrative purposes, maritime units of the same type are organised into squadrons (e.g. destroyers) or flotillas (e.g. submarine flotilla) which together form the fleet.  However, for the command of operations, maritime forces are organised into echelons of up to four levels which, in decreasing order of importance, are: Task Force (TF), Task Group (TG), Tactical Unit (TU) and Tactical Element (TE).  This division is flexible; it bears no relation to the levels of war or levels of command, but it is broadly hierarchical with commanders exercising command through their subordinate formation commanders (i.e. Commander Task Force (CTF), Commander Task Group (CTG), Commander Task Unit (CTU), and Commander Task Element (CTE)).  Both NATO and UK national maritime forces use a similar numbering system to identify TFs and their constituent parts.  TFs are allocated a three figure number (e.g. 401); TGs are referred to by that number with two figures of decimals (e.g. 401.01); TUs by another decimal point and two figures of decimals (e.g. 401.01.01), and so on.  The commander of the highest level formation would normally be the JFMCC.  The size of his HQ will depend upon the size of his component.  A small force could be commanded by the Commanding Officer (CO) of one of its ships; a large force would require a dedicated commander and staff.  The JFMCC will normally nominate an Officer in Tactical Command (OTC) to be responsible for accomplishing the mission of a force, who may in turn delegate responsibility for specific functions to Composite Warfare Commanders (CWCs).  The Command and Control (C2) of an amphibious force, which can range in size from a single ship to a full Amphibious Task Force (ATF), is predicated on a joint approach and the maritime and landing force commanders, respectively Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF) and Commander Landing Force (CLF), will normally be collocated in the Amphibious Warfare (AW) command platform.

A TF / TG’s size and its mix of units will depend on the scale and the nature of the tasks it might need to undertake, as well as the combat functions required to discharge those tasks.  This composition can be remarkably varied.  In recent years, the UK has mounted TFs of a single submarine and TEs of several escorts.  In multinational operations, national maritime contingents are usually integrated fully into the Task Organisation; NATO forces could be incorporated at any level, but non-NATO forces would usually be kept in a national grouping.  Some units may be organised into functional groups. Sometimes these can be temporary, such as deception groups, Surface (Search) Attack Unit (SAU) and Surface Action Group (SAG), which are usually constituted for a particular task.  Alternatively, they can be fairly permanent, such as Mine Counter Measures Ship (MCM) groups or amphibious groups where they carry out a specialised maritime function.  These are usually established for particular missions under a functional commander. Functional commanders are normally responsible for all local warfare functions within their functional group.  These may in turn be delegated to local warfare coordinators.

Within a task formation, the OTC normally delegates control and coordination of the main areas of maritime warfare to Principal Warfare Commanders (PWCs).  The principal areas of maritime warfare are Anti-Air Warfare (AAW), Under Water Warfare (UWW) and Amphibious Warfare (AW).  These can be further divided into Air Warfare, Surface Warfare, Submarine Warfare and Mine Countermeasures, although there are others.  PWCs are normally delegated authority over all the units in their formation for that warfare duty; the force weapons of a single ship could be employed by one PWC whilst another directs the movements of that ship.

The Land Components philosophy of command has three enduring tenets: timely decision making, the importance of understanding a superior commander’s intentions, and a clear responsibility to fulfil that intention. Although Land force operations are guided using campaign and operation plans and orders to achieve the objectives set out in the JTFC’s directive, the fundamental requirement is to allow a subordinate commander to act decisively and independently within the framework of his superior’s intentions.  This requires a style of command, which promotes decentralised command, freedom and speed of action and initiative.  Mission command meets this requirement and is thus a central pillar of Army doctrine.  Mission command requires C2 structures, which allow flexibility and decentralisation.  In some circumstances a commander may have to impose a centralised style of command in order to concentrate force and to synchronise combat support.  Decentralised command is the philosophy of command preferred since it allows subordinates to use their initiative within a defined framework.  Land C2 structures should therefore be modular and be able to fit into the framework of an operation at the appropriate level.  This allows decisions to be made at the lowest level possible, and negates the requirement for all but essential information to be passed up and down the chain of command.  It will also allow appropriate decisions to be made swiftly in the confusion and uncertainty of conflict, when a clear picture and rapid communications are difficult or even impossible, to achieve.

The JFLCC’s C2 line will normally be organised by combat task, with combat support and combat service support assets allocated as required.  The JFLCC will organise his HQ staff in such a manner as to ensure the ability to orchestrate operations across the range of military operations.  His HQ will normally comprise a Command Group, consisting of the JFLCC and his principal staff officers, together with specialist intelligence, operations, logistics and CIS divisions, and civil cooperation and component liaison elements.  Land units and formations are complex and yet flexible structures.  They can be task organised and force packaged in many different ways, and a battalion can take many different shapes.  Consequently, land forces require many C2 layers in order to conduct operations.

In order to apply the manoeuvre approach to warfare, the Land Component currently identifies three core operational functions: find, fix and strike.  These may be consecutive or simultaneous.  Finding endures throughout operations and spans locating, identifying and assessing the adversary.  Fixing is to deny the adversary or protagonists their goals, distract them and thus deprive them of freedom of action, while ensuring one’s own.  Striking uses freedom of action to manoeuvre, to get into a position of advantage from which force can be threatened or applied, and to threaten or apply force.  The core functions are organised in the framework of deep, close and rear operations.  This framework has both conceptual and geographic meaning.  Much of the art of command and conduct of operations on land is the application and balancing of resources and assets to finding, fixing and striking, in the operational framework, in time and space.  Deep operations are those which attack the adversary’s resolution, cohesion and ability to sustain and regenerate his efforts.  This obviously includes operations against such assets as headquarters, logistics and reserves.  Close operations are those in which the adversary’s combat forces are engaged in direct contact.  As such they may not be decisive, but they will play a vital role in defeating an adversary; they will achieve the military circumstances necessary for success. Rear operations are those which protect and sustain one’s own vitals; they will include the maintenance, sustainment and protection of one’s own C2, logistics, Lines of Communication (LOC), reserves and morale.

The Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) HQ plays the pivotal role in the decision / action cycle for air C2.  Information is fed in from a variety of sources, which the HQ staffs fuse and analyse to provide options for the JFACC to command and control his apportioned forces, ultimately through the Air Tasking Order (ATO).  The composition, size and possible locations of each JFAC HQ will be different, reflecting not only the scale and type of air operations, but also the JFACC's style of command and the physical circumstances of the location.  Ideally, the JFAC HQ is collocated with the JTFHQ, but the tactical situation and development of the land battle may mean that this is not possible.  For example, because of political constraints, the JTFC may feel it necessary to require the JFACC to be with him, despite the two HQs not being collocated.  Consequently and although less than ideal, there may be circumstances when elements of the JFAC HQ need to operate from split sites.  In these circumstances the JFACC may decide to keep his Strategy cell with him, but leave the Joint Air Operations Centre (JAOC) and other HQ functions under the control of his deputy at a separate location.  In deciding how and where to split his HQ, the JFACC must take into account many factors, not least of which is the reliability and robustness of the available CIS.

The process of air C2 follows a cycle, often referred to as the Observation-Orientation-Decision-Action (OODA) loop.  To obtain the initiative, the JFACC must complete his decision / action cycle more quickly than his enemy, otherwise his plans will be overtaken by enemy action and he will be restricted to reactive decisions.  He needs to continually review the cycle to see where activity can be accelerated to stay ahead of his enemy's cycle, and to exploit that advantage to surprise his enemy.  The overall air operations plan is a complex interaction of OODA loops inside and outside the JFAC HQ that influences the tempo of the joint campaign.  The OODA loop encompasses the following sequence of activity:

Guidance

The JFACC makes his intentions known to his staff and subordinate commanders.

Air Estimate

A continuous effort to collect and evaluate all available information on the location, nature and actions of friendly and hostile forces is undertaken.

Planning

The planning process examines the scope for cooperation and coordinated action with other commands; assesses alternative options and sets out best course of action, allowing the Air Operations Directive (AOD) to be drawn up.  Plans and lists include the:

Master Air Plan

Target Nomination List

Joint integrated Target List

Joint Air Allocation Plan

Tasking

Assignment of responsibilities to specific resources through the production and promulgation of the ATO and Airspace Control Order (ACO)s.

Execution and Combat Assessment

Implement tasking, monitor progress, assess results and correct deficiencies.  A reporting system that includes Mission Reports (MISREPS), Assessment Reports (ASSESSREPS) and battle damage assessment reports, supports this element of the process.

The Theatre Air Command and Control System (TACCS) is the JFACC's subordinate C2 structure that enables him to exercise centralised C2 with decentralised execution for any form of operation.  The TACCS is continuously under development and combines C2 and Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) elements to create a multi-functional Air C2 set of capabilities which can react with rapid, tailored action to assorted threats in varied environments.  The TACCS consists of both ground-based assets (Tactical Air Control Centre (TACC) and Air Support Operations (ASO)) and a number of airborne sensors. These airborne sensors include the ISTAR Triad, comprising the E3-D, Nimrod R and the Airborne Stand-Off Radar (ASTOR), which may be supplemented in the future by MRA4 and possibly Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS). Until its demise in 2006 the Canberra PR9 will continue to provide photographic support.

To achieve the close liaison required between the CC HQs, an Air Operation Coordination Centre (AOCC) may be established on behalf of the JFACC within the organisation of each of the other components.  An AOCC is assigned to and remains collocated with the respective other component's HQ; e.g. the Air Operation Coordination Centre Maritime (AOCC(M)) will operate alongside the JFMCC's Maritime Air Operation Centre (MAOC) whilst the Air Operation Coordination Centre Land (AOCC(L)) is likely to be collocated with the JFLCC's G2 / G3 operations.  Each AOCC is responsible to its parent JAOC, but is responsive to the component with which it is located.  The AOCCs advise and facilitate the coordination of air requests and tasking in support of their host component commander.  Reciprocal arrangements are provided by the JFMCC’s Maritime Liaison Element (MLE) and the JFLCC’s Battlefield Coordination Detachment (BCD), which likewise coordinate requests or requirements and maintain 'up-to-date' pictures of the other components' operations.  The MLE and BCD are located with, and are responsive to, the needs of the JAOC, but are responsible to their parent component HQ for which they progress their respective air apportionment bids for incorporation in the JFACC's apportionment recommendation to the JTFC.  These liaison elements are essential in facilitating the necessary transparency between component HQs.

The NATO North Atlantic Council (NAC), on which all member nations are represented, exercises political control of the military chain of command by means of directives and an agreed system of NATO Rules of Engagement (ROE) working through the Military Committee (MC).  Nations agree to delegate OPCOM of their forces to a Major NATO Commander (MNC) at the appropriate stage in the build up to an operation.  This gives the commander the freedom, within the constraints of the ROE and the directives from the MC, to plan and execute operations without direct reference to individual nations about the employment of their forces.  In these circumstances, therefore, OPCOM of British Forces would be delegated to the appropriate NATO commander in accordance with pre-arranged plans and assignments.

In 2004, a major restructuring of NATO’s Military Command (NMC) Organisation was implemented.  The NMC was reduced from two operational strategic commands to one Allied Command Operations (ACO), with the creation of a functional strategic command for Allied Command Transformation (ACT).  The five operational regional commands were reduced to two Joint Force Commands (JFCs), and a Joint Headquarters (JHQ).  Finally, the 13 operational subordinate commands were reduced to six JFCCs. The Combined Air Operation Centres (CAOCs) were also reduced from ten to six (four static and two deployable).

ACO

ACO will be responsible for all Alliance operations (to include operational elements that formerly came under the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT)).  Strategic Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) assumes command for the preparation and conduct of all joint (sea, land and air) NATO operations from the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Belgium.  The JFCs, one in Brunssum, the Netherlands, and one in Naples, Italy – can conduct operations from their static locations or provide a land-based Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) headquarters and a robust but more limited standing Joint Headquarters (JHQ), in Lisbon, Portugal, from which a deployable sea-based CJTF HQ capability can be drawn.

Component / Tactical Level

JFCCs, which will provide service-specific-land, maritime, or air-expertise at the operational level and will be available for use in any operation. For the Joint Force Command in Brunssum, there will be an Air Component Command at Ramstein, Germany; a Maritime Component Command at Northwood in the United Kingdom; and a Land Component Command at Heidelberg, Germany.  For the Joint Force Command in Naples, there will be an Air Component Command at Izmir, Turkey; a Maritime Component Command in Naples; and a Land Component Command at Madrid, Spain.

In addition to these component commands, there will be four static Combined Air Operations Centres (CAOCs) - in Uedem, Germany; Finderup, Denmark; Poggio Renatico, Italy; and Larissa, Greece; and two deployable CAOCs - in Uedem and Poggio Renatico. As the deployable CAOCs will need to exercise their capability to mobilise and deploy, the current facilities at Torrejon Air Base in Spain would be the primary site for training and exercising in that region. A small NATO air facility support staff would be stationed at Torrejon to support this capability.

It should be noted that the expanded NATO structure embraces Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary and CAOC responsibilities are expanded appropriately.

ACT

SACLANT was decommissioned and ACT was established in its place and will oversee the transformation of NATO's military capabilities.  ACT will enhance training, improve capabilities, test and develop doctrines and conduct experiments to assess new concepts. It will also facilitate the dissemination and introduction of new concepts and promote interoperability.  Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT) headquarters are in Norfolk, US.  There will be an ACT Staff Element in Belgium for resource and defence planning issues.

ACT will include:

·                     Joint Warfare Centre in Norway.

·                     Joint Force Training Centre in Poland.

·                     Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre in Portugal.

·                     ACT Headquarters will also supervise the Undersea Research Centre in La Spezia, Italy.

·                     A NATO Maritime Interdiction Operational Training Centre in Greece, associated with ACT, is also envisaged.

In addition, a number of nationally- or multinationally-sponsored Centres of Excellence focused on transformation in specific military fields will support the command.

NATO has become more involved in Military Operation Other Than War (MOOTW), largely because of its large multinational military infrastructure and its capacity to support the large numbers of operations that the United Nations (UN) envisages might be necessary in the future.  However, NATO has no legal basis for operations outside NATO sovereign territory and so formal agreement between NATO and the UN, or the host country, is required before NATO can get involved.

Similar arrangements will apply to directing Non-Article 5 operations as are used for the C2 of Article 5 operations, except that there are unlikely to be pre-arranged plans and force assignments.  There is general acceptance that all forces assigned to NATO may be available for non-Article 5 operations, but each member nation reserves the right to decide on a case-by-case basis whether and how to participate.  Forces from non-NATO nations may also participate alongside those of NATO.  It is likely that OPCOM of allocated forces would be retained at a national level.

When a crisis occurs, the NAC may consider the creation of a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF), with forces drawn from mainly member states however, should the situation dictate, complementary elements from non-NATO nations may also be requested.  As a multinational (combined) and joint task force, the CJTF would be task-organised and formed for the full range of the Alliance’s military missions.  Commanded by Commander CJTF (COMCJTF) from a multinational and joint headquarters, the CJTF provides NATO with a mechanism for extending its operational capability beyond its traditional borders.  The CJTF HQ would, however, still remain an integral part of NATO’s military command structure.

The Western European Union (WEU) is the defence component of the European Union (EU).  In the Petersberg Declaration of 1992, the member states pledged their support for conflict prevention and peacekeeping efforts in cooperation with the UN and Organisation on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).  Although Europe is the natural and paramount focus of WEU interest, there are no restrictions on the WEU's geographic area of potential peacekeeping operations.  However, either the UN or OSCE must mandate such operations.  WEU operations would be directed by the EU Council of Ministers, which is the equivalent of the NAC.  As the WEU does not have its own military command structure, it would probably rely on NATO for planning and C2 arrangements.

UK military forces have for many years been involved in MOOTW, which embrace Peace Support Operations (PSO), often under various UN mandates and Security Resolutions.  The majority of these operations have been multinational in nature.  As the UN does not possess a full military command and control structure capable of commanding forces in theatre, the resources of organisations such as NATO and the WEU are utilised for the larger scale operations.  The UK has indicated its willingness to undertake MOOTW with, or on behalf of, the UN and the OSCE.  This could include deployments of UK forces designed to prevent conflict, restore peace by resolving or terminating conflict before it escalates to war, or assist with the rebuilding of peace after conflict or war.  There are two classes of UN operation in which UK forces could be involved:

Authorised

Operations for which the UN sanctions military intervention with the lead role assigned to a nation or an organisation such as NATO or the WEU.

Directed

Operations conducted under UN auspices with a military force under UN control.

Ad hoc coalitions are unlikely to have any previously-agreed methods of multinational political control or any prior commitment to assign forces.  Therefore, the C2 of these coalition operations is likely to be based on the procedures of the lead nation.  In these circumstances, CDS would direct that OPCOM of British Forces be delegated to a nominated UK Jt Comd, who would further delegate OPCON, TACOM or TACON to the multinational commander or, for UN operations, to the UK National Contingent Commander (NCC).  The PJHQ would act as the UK’s military strategic planning focus for these operations, but its precise role would depend on whether or not the UK was the lead nation.  If the operation was UK-led, the PJHQ would form the nucleus of the multinational Operations HQ, augmented as necessary by staff from the other participating nations.  It would also provide staff to form the nucleus of the deployed multinational JTFHQ.  If the UK was not the lead nation, the PJHQ would coordinate the activities of the single services in deploying, sustaining and recovering British Forces assigned to the operation.  It might also provide staff to the multinational HQ.  A National Representative would usually be nominated to the appropriate level of multinational command (normally at OPCOM level) to provide a link for national political control of the employment of British forces.  For UN operations, the UK would appoint a UK NCC.

Whilst the UK’s National Representative / NCC would perform standalone liaison functions, and may have a small dedicated support staff, the majority of the UK staff would be embedded in the lead nation's JTFC / CC HQ structure.  This is generally achievable with simple coalitions between nations that are familiar with each other's working practices and have trained together regularly (e.g. US / UK).  At the other end of the scale, complex coalitions between relatively unfamiliar nations can lead to manpower intensive HQs, rich in liaison officers with intricate national chains of command embedded within the overall HQ structure.  Indeed, some nations may insist on setting up their own JTFC / CC HQ working alongside the lead JTFC / CC HQ.  The potential impact of these latter arrangements on a commander's decision cycle is obvious and the remedies may occupy a considerable portion of the HQ's work.  The ownership of information and problems associated with releasing information to third parties, even within coalition members, can become very significant and put the entire process at risk.

Framework Security Organisations

(1)        Associate Members of WEU.

(2)        Observers of WEU.

(3)        Associate Partners of WEU.