UK Tactical Data Systems Reference Guide
CIS Operations Overview

Operational Considerations

Military Strategy must enable the achievement of political ends.  In a war of national survival the political end will be clear, but if vital national interests are not involved, it may be necessary to tailor the political objective to match what can realistically be achieved.  Therefore, military objectives must be stated in terms of what constitutes success; i.e. the desired end state.

Success in conflict can be achieved through identifying and controlling or destroying the enemy’s Centre of Gravity (COG).  Examples might be the mass of an enemy’s army, a particular base area, a crucial resource, the leadership, the command structure, or national will; in particular, neutralising an enemy’s C2 (such as his sensors, HQs and communications) can effectively paralyse his military effectiveness.  It is also vital to identify and protect the COG of your own side.  The manoeuvrist approach to operations is one in which shattering the enemy’s overall cohesion and will to fight, rather than his materiel, is paramount.  For success, a commander at any level needs to seize and maintain the initiative at critical points in time, which will be determined by his objectives and wider circumstances.  Deception and psychological operations are also important in shaping the perceptions of opponents.  A commander’s overall strategy for a particular operation may therefore consist of a set of subordinate campaigns which may either be sequential or cumulative.

In broad terms, success in modern warfare against a well-equipped enemy requires superior intelligence, a quicker decision making cycle, flexible and agile forces, including systems that can apply firepower precisely at long-range, and sustainability.  To achieve his military objectives, a commander must clearly be assigned adequate forces that are properly equipped and trained.  Often, however, the deciding factor in determining the feasibility of operations, particularly those at long-range, is logistics.  ROE are an important method of articulating the political and legal constraints imposed on the use of military force, and up-to-date intelligence, accurate weapons and robust Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) are essential for attacking key targets efficiently.  Finally, in order to maintain public support for any military operation, media operations are necessary to release as much accurate information as possible, as quickly as possible, subject only to operational security and the safety of British and allied lives.

Accurate, reliable information, including up-to-date intelligence, is vital to support all military activities at each level.  The fundamental output that all commanders seek from CIS is the timely provision of information to aid the commander’s decision making process.  The objective should be to achieve information dominance over the opponent; that is, to have virtually unrestricted access to reliable information on all aspects of the conflict, while denying the same to the enemy.  The underlying aim, however, is to make decisions more quickly than the enemy, thereby enabling commanders to employ their forces much more effectively.  There is, however, a serious risk of commanders being overloaded with information.  It is therefore vital to design information systems and procedures which can filter the vast array of information from an increasing variety of sources to ensure that commanders at each level receive only what is relevant to their needs.  CIS provides the means by which C2 is exercised by a force commander.  To achieve campaign objectives, CIS must be deployed and maintained to achieve the projected rate of activity and scope of operations.  The proper application of the CIS principles is necessary to ensure that CIS functions operate effectively under a wide variety of conditions, throughout all phases of the campaign.

Economy of Employment.  Demand will frequently exceed supply and priorities will need to be set.

Flexibility.  CIS must be sufficiently flexible in order to adapt to changing operational circumstances and priorities.

Interoperability.  The requirements for interoperability both between UK single Service systems and with allies will require early identification.

Security.  Sufficient safeguards must be in place to ensure confidentiality, integrity and availability of CIS and the information it carries.

Capacity.  Sufficient CIS must be available to meet the predicted demand.

Survivability.  CIS must be sufficiently robust to withstand electronic and physical attack.

Data.  At the bottom of the hierarchy, comprises raw numbers or facts (e.g. an ac’s latitude and longitude is an example of data, but it says nothing about where the ac is going or what it is doing).

Information.  Turning data into information requires correlation.  The data needs to be organised and perhaps combined with other data so that trends become apparent.  Information explains what is happening at a basic level (e.g. a series of latitudes and longitudes over time indicates an ac’s direction and average speed).

Knowledge.  Information becomes knowledge when it is combined with context, education and experience.  Knowledge illustrates something about the bigger picture and often explains why something is happening (e.g. knowing an aircraft’s direction and speed, in combination with the ac type and tracks that similar ac have flown in the past, may identify its probable mission).

Understanding.  Understanding, or perhaps wisdom, is at the top of the hierarchy.  Understanding is achieved when knowledge is combined with intuition, perspective and judgement.  It permits the reception of information to be anticipated and discerns where (and whether) that information fits, and how it should be acted upon.  Understanding explains where and when the ac is likely to change course and height and why it will behave in a certain way.